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Taking on Water: The Supreme Court Rejects a
Temporary Flooding Exception to Fifth Amendment
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United StatesI
I. INTRODUCTION
In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States,
the Supreme Court addressed whether there is a blanket
exception to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to
temporary government-induced flooding. The case is significant
in that the Court held there is no automatic exemption for
temporary flooding cases, reversing the controversial decision of
the Court of Federal Claims, which held that a bright-line rule
should be applied to government-induced flooding cases.
3
Emphasizing a need for case-by-case review of factual
circumstances when making a decision about whether a
temporary flooding can rise to the level of a taking under the
Fifth Amendment, the Court has opened the door wider for
potential future litigation.4 The implications of the decision
involve the tension between the practical and the equitable, that
is, whether the government should, through such agencies as the
Corps of Engineers, be able to regulate water levels without
worrying about increased litigation?
This note begins by setting forth the facts and events that
led to the Federal Circuit's decision, and the Supreme Court's
subsequent review of it. The second section then examines the
body of precedent considered by the Court, followed by a third
section examining the legal analysis and holding of Arkansas
Game & Fish. The final section is a critical discussion and
commentary on Arkansas Game & Fish, which explores the
'Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States,133 S. Ct. 511 (2012)
[hereinafter Arkansas Game & Fish].2 Id. at 515.
3id.
4 Id. at 518.
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practical policy implications and possible consequences that may
follow this Takings Clause determination. Ultimately, the
conclusion drawn is that Arkansas Game & Fish was a sensible
(and unsurprising) holding that nevertheless may cause
difficulties for the Corps of Engineers and other government
actors when dealing with environmental issues in the future.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") facilitated flooding that extended into the peak period
for timber growth on forest land owned and managed by the
petitioner, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission
("Commission").5 The repeated flooding not only interrupted the
ordinary use and enjoyment of the land, but also damaged or
destroyed more than 18 million board feet of timber.6  The
Commission sought relief against the United States pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.7
Located in Arkansas, the land in question, owned by the
Commission, included 23,000 acres, and is called the Dave
Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area
("Management Area" or "Area"), which extended along both
banks of the Black River.8 The Management Area, which is
operated as a wildlife and hunting preserve, is forested with
multiple hardwood timber species essential to the character of the
Area as an animal habitat, recreational area, and hunting venue. 9
The Corps of Engineers constructed the Clearwater Dam
("Dam") 115 miles upstream in 1948, implementing the Water
5 Id. at 515.
6id.
7 Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]o person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall piravte property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
8 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 515.
9 Id. at 515-16.
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 20, No. 2
Control Manual ("Manual") soon afterwards to determine the
rates at which water would be released from the dam.' The
Manual release rates vary according to the seasons, but there are
permit-planned deviations from the prescribed rates for varying
considerations of agricultural, recreational, and other demands. I I
Complications began to arise in 1993, when the Corps
authorized a planned deviation - releasing water from the Dam at
a slower rate than usual - in order to give farmers more harvest
time. 12 The cost of this farmer-requested deviation coincidingly
interfered with the Management Area's tree-growing season.
13
Similar deviations were implemented by the Corps from 1994
through 2000, though the decision to deviate from the Manual
was made independently every year and the amount of deviation
varied. 1
4
The Commission initiated the lawsuit at issue in Arkansas
Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States15 in 2005, claiming that
the deviations from the Manual amounted to a taking of property
that entitled the Commission to compensation.1 6 The cumulative
impact of the deviation caused sustained flooding during tree-
growing season from 1993 to 1999, resulting in the destruction of
valuable timber and a substantial change in the landscape
necessitating costly reclamation measures.' Upon considering
the Commission's case, the Court of Federal Claims held in favor
of the Commission and awarded it $5.7 million, accounting for






15 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 74 Fed. C1. 426 (Fed. C1.
2006).16 Id. at 427.
17 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 516-17.
18 See Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 87 Fed. C1. 594 (Fed.
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In a split decision, the Federal Circuit reversed. 19 Judging
"cases involving flooding and [flowage] easements" to be a
special case, the court rejected the general principle that
temporary government action may give rise to a "takings" claim
if permanent action of the same character would constitute a
taking.2°  The Federal Circuit held a government-induced
flooding can give rise to a "takings" claim only if the flooding is
"permanent or inevitably recurring."' 2' Relying on Sanguinetti v.
United States and United States v. Cress, the Federal Court
concluded that the Corps' flooding of the Management Area did
not constitute a "taking."
22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
question of whether government actions causing repeated
floodings must be permanent or inevitably recurring to constitute
a "taking" of property.23 The Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Court's conclusion, holding that recurrent flooding, even




19 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378-79
(Fed. Cir. 2011)( finding, in a 2-1 decision, reversing the trial court's
judgment, concluding that, as a matter of law, government flooding of private
property can never constitute a taking if it is the result of an "ad hoc" or
"temporary" government policy because temporary flooding can never give
rise to a taking).20 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 517 (quoting Arkansas Game & Fish
Comm'n, 637 F.3d at 1374).
21 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 517 (quoting Arkansas Game & Fish
Comm'n, 637 F.3d at 1378).
22 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct at 518. See Sanguinetti v. United States,
264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924); See also United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328
(1917).23 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518.24 Id. at 515.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is rooted as
much in fairness as it is in the historical development of the
United States - as such, the ebbs and flows of its common law
development has presented a complex body of precedent.
25
Fashioned with a purpose to "bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," 26 the Takings
Clause has often been discussed in tandem with certain civil
claims and eminent domain law.27  The first hurdle of
understanding the Takings Clause as it applies to temporary
flooding, however, is to understand the government's duty and
when it is triggered.
B. Early Supreme Court Precedent
It is well-established in United Sates case law that
"[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an
interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical
duty to compensate the former owner. '28 Cases like Loretto
made it clear that some bright lines have indeed existed in takings
case law for some time. For example, permanent physical
occupation is always a taking in the context of the Fifth
Amendment.30 Through its interpretation of case law, however,
the Court soon extended the Takings Clause to include
interference with private lands that are temporary in nature. 31
2 5Seeid. at 518.
26 Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
27 SeeArkanas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518-19.28 Id. at 518 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)).29 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518.
30 id.
31 See id. at 518-519.
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The Supreme Court first answered the question of
whether the government "takes possession" specifically with
regard to government-induced flooding in 1872. 32 When the
Wisconsin Legislature in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 33 authorized
the defendant to build a dam which submerged the plaintiffs land
under a newly-formed lake, the defendant argued because the
damage was merely "consequential" and the government had not
exercised eminent domain over the title to the plaintiff's land, the
flooding was not a taking. 34  The Court disagreed, holding
"where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions
of water, earth, sand, or other material ... so as to effectually





Not long after, in United States v. Cress, the Court
established that seasonal flooding, in addition to more permanent
inundations of land, could also rise to the level of a taking.3 6 The
government's construction of a lock and dam, which subjected
the plaintiff's land to "intermittent but inevitably recurring
overflows," gave rise to a takings claim that was no less valid
than the claim of an owner whose land was continuously kept
under water. 3
7
Though the Court has long recognized the government's
duty to compensate landowners when it floods private property,
38
strictures were put on that with the holding in Sanguinetti v.
32 See Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166
(1871).33 id.
34 1d. at 177.
351Id. at 181.
36 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).37 id.
38 See, e.g., Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181 ("[W]here real estate is invaded by
superinduced additions of water.. .so as to effectually destroy or impair its
usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution.").
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United States.39 This 1924 decision, in which the court clarified
that flooding caused by the government must "constitute an
actual, permanent invasion of land" to rise to the level of a
taking, has led to no small amount of confusion in Takings
Clause considerations. 40  In Sanguinetti, the Court held the
government should be free from takings liability because there
was a lack of intent and foreseeability, and instead held that
because the interference with property was consequential, the
government had no implied obligation to compensate the owner
for indirect and consequential damages.4 '
C. Modernization of Takings Clause interpretation
- WWII and After.
The Supreme Court's intensified interpretation of the
Takings Clause loosened after World War 11.42 The Court
recognized that interference with property for wartime necessity,
though temporary, still entitled the owner to compensation under
the Takings Clause.43 In United States v. Causby, a landmark
decision, the Court acknowledged a taking had occurred
wherever there had been "direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of land" - even with a temporary time-
frame. 44 Since the post-WWII era, the Court has recognized that
39 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).40 1d. at 149.
41 See id. at 150 ("The most that can be said is that there was probably some
increased flooding due to the canal and that a greater injury may have resulted
than otherwise would have been the case. But this and all other matters aside,
the injury was in its nature indirect and consequential, for which no implied
obligation on the part of the government can arise.")(subsequent supporting
citations omitted).
42 See Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. 511,519 (2012).
43 id.
44 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (frequent overflights
from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property
owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); See also,
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (flooding of claimant's
land was a taking even though claimant successfully "reclaimed most of his
land which the Government originally took by flooding").
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the consequences of a government action need not be permanent
to constitute a taking.4 5 Even where the property owner was able
to regain use of some or all of her land, "no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation
for the period during which the taking was effective."
46
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In holding that the government's action of temporarily
flooding property can sometimes constitute a taking, the Court
focused on precedent establishing both that government-induced
flooding can rise to the level of a taking, and a taking can be both
temporary and compensable.47  Although the Court does not
address issues of causation, foreseeability, substantiality, and
amount of damages, the instant case was reversed and remanded
in regards to those issues.48 Instead, the Court ruled on the
Federal Circuit's supposed single automatic-exemption decision,
holding that temporary government-induced flooding is not
automatically exempted from Takings Clause inspection.49
First and foremost, the Court refused to create a bright-
line rule for takings cases, noting that such claims turn on
situation-specific factual inquiries. 50 Precedent established in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. and United States v. Cress maintain
that government-induced flooding and seasonally recurring
45 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 519.46 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987); See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337 (2002) ("[W]e do not
hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it
effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive
significance one way or the other.").47 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 519.481 d. at 523.
4 9 ld. at 522.
50 Id. at 513 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
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flooding can both constitute takings. 5' The Court has also held
that impermanent takings can also be compensable.52
Relying primarily on Sanguinetti v. United States,53 the
government in the instant case advocated a blanket temporary-
flooding exception.54 Emphasizing one sentence of Sanguinetti
in particular, the government argued "in order to create an
enforceable liability against the Government it is, at least,
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure,
and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land.,
55
Instead of taking this as a definitive rule that there can be no
temporary taking caused by floods, the Court decided instead to
defer to the precedent introduced in the WWII-era cases and First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles,5 6 which observed that compensation was, contrary
to the government's argument, appropriate for some temporary
takings.57
The Court also dismissed the Government's argument that
reversing the Federal Circuit's decision would put public works
dedicated to flood control at risk.5 8  Acknowledging that the
public interests involved are important, the Court nevertheless
hdld that "they are not categorically different from the interests at
stake in myriad other Takings Clause cases in which this Court
has rejected similar arguments when deployed to urge blanket
exemptions from the Fifth Amendment's instruction. '  The
Government's attempt at raising an alternative argument with
51 Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871);
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
53 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).54 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 519.
55 Id. at 520 (citing Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149).
56 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, Cal., 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
57Arkansas Game &Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 520.
" Id. at 514.
59 id.
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regard to collateral or incidental damage also failed. 60 The Court
declined to address the issue because it was first raised at oral
argument.6'
In this case, the Court emphasized that in such a fact-
based determination, there is no "magic formula [that] enables a
court to judge, in every case, whether a given government
inference with property is a taking."62 Normally, the factual
inquiries required in a Takings Clause case require the Court to
evaluate duration of the government interference, degree to
which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of
authorized government action, and severity of interference.
63
Because the Federal Circuit handed down its decision entirely
based on the temporary nature of the government's action,
however, the Court reviewed the takings issue only in light of the
duration of the flooding. 64 The Court seems not only to note, but
to stress that on remand, that the issues of causation,




In reversing the Federal Circuit's decision in Arkansas
Game & Fish, the Court rejected, unsurprisingly, any hard and
fast rule about what constitutes a taking.66 Where the Court of
Claims had been willing to draw a bright line, and the Federal
Court even more so, the Supreme Court's consideration of its
body of precedent made the outcome of this conflict one that put
to rest any question of a bright-line rule.67 The decision is
60 id.
61 Id
62 Id. at 518.
631Id. at 514.64 Id. at 514-15.65 id.
66 1d. at 515.67 Seeid. at 518-19.
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significant to the "bundle of sticks" that landowners and the
government alike cling to with regard to property rights.68 In
fact, some interpret Arkansas Game & Fish as "cast[ing] doubt
on the viability of 'blanket' defenses in future takings claims."
69
A. The Justices' Concerns and Yet Another
Balancing Test
Though the Court's opinion in Arkansas Game & Fish
was a unanimous decision, at oral arguments more than one
Justice was worried about what deciding the case for the
Commission would do to precedent. 70  Chief Justice Roberts
seemed most concerned with the land-water takings distinction,
saying, "It's a different case when they go in with the chainsaw
than when they go in with water." 7 1 Justice Ginsberg questioned
whether the Court would have to overrule or modify Sanguinetti
72
and other decisions in order to find for the Commission. Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, seemed less concerned with the
necessity of taking either of those actions. 73 By his reasoning, the
language quoted from Sanguinetti was mere dicta, and, insofar as
the decision posits that a temporary invasion cannot constitute a
68 Brian T. Hodges, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States: U.S.
Supreme Court Disapproves of Per Se Defenses in Takings Cases, 65 PLAN. &
ENVTL. L. No. 3, 10 (2013).69 id.
(quoting Arkansas Game & Fish, "In view of the nearly infinite variety of
ways in which government actions can affect property interests, the Court has
recognized few invariable rules in this area.").
70 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Arkansas Game & Fish
Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (No. 11-597).
71 Jonathan Stempel, Supreme Court weighs federally createdfloods, REUTERS
(Oct. 3, 2012 2:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-usa-
court-flooding-idUSBRE89217120121003.
72 Brian T. Hodges, More thoughts on the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
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taking, it has already been overruled by the Court's large body of
cases recognizing that temporary interferences can constitute
takings,74 particularly those cases determined post-WWII.
Much of the attention leading up to the Court's opinion in
Arkansas Game & Fish was focused on what test the court would
utilize; whether a temporary flood invasion should be treated like
all other temporary physical takings or whether the Court should
devise a new test applicable only to cases of temporary
flooding.75 The Court has applied the same "character of the
invasion" test from United States v. Causby to every physical
taking case it has reviewed, regardless of the method or duration
of the invasion.76 With the test the Court settled on, it seems as
though the tests advocated for in the PLF/Cato Institute/ALF
amicus briefs was correct. 77  Looking at the different factors
surrounding the flooding in Arkansas Game & Fish, the Court
prescribes a balancing test considering the length of the
government's interference with private property interests, the
degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable
result of authorized government action, the character of the land
at issue, the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectation
regarding the land's use, and the severity of the interference.78
Still, not all were satisfied with the Court's decision in
regard to what test it advocated. 79 Brian T. Hodges, one of the
authors of the PLF/Cato Institute/ALF amicus briefs comments:
74 id
75 Brian T. Hodges, Is the federal government shifting the focus in Arkansas





78 Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct., at 514.
79 Hodges, supra note 72.
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The decision, however, did not indicate what test is
applicable to temporary physical invasions. Instead, it listed,
without differentiation, fragments from various tests that have
been developed over the years to determine different types of
takings. For example, the Court recited the "intent or
foreseeability" test that is applied as a threshold inquiry to
distinguish physical takings from torts like negligence and
trespass. The Court also referenced the "character of the
invasion" test that was developed to determine whether a
government act physically appropriates an interest in private
property. The Court next recited the "reasonable investment-
backed expectations" test developed specifically for ad hoc
regulatory takings in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City.8
0
Arguing that the Court's own declaration that it intended
only to rule narrowly, 81 Hodges rejects the notion that the court
was advocating any sort of hybrid test.82 "[T]he only conclusion
that can be drawn from Arkansas Game & Fish Commission,"
Hodges claims, "is that tests that control physical invasion
takings still control physical takings cases, and the tests that
control regulatory takings still only apply in regulatory takings
cases."
83
In utilizing a balancing test, the Court rejected any
attempt of lower courts to carve out an exception to this area of
takings precedent or make any easy considerations. As with any
balancing test, however, it introduces its own body of
complications and considerations. By expressly rejecting any
distinction between temporary and permanent government
intrusions on private property, the decision in Arkansas Game &
80 id.
81 Id. ("We rule today, simply and only, that government induced flooding
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Fish "closes a dangerous loophole in takings law that could be
exploited to allow the government to avoid its obligation to pay
just compensation when it takes private property.' '84 Simply put,
"the Takings Clause does not come with a stopwatch . .
imposing arbitrary conditions and limits on the duty to
compensate only serves to weaken property rights, and, by
extension, all the rights secured by the Constitution." 85 Going
forward, then, the meaning and impact of this language will
likely be a hotly contested aspect of the remand proceedings in
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission.86 It remains to be seen
whether the lower court, upon revising this controversy on
remand, will fall back on the Court's more traditional approach,
or see this language as warranting an entirely new test
altogether.
87
B. The Flip Side: the Burden of Losing for the
Corps of Engineers
Though it is an apt observation that the government
should not be able to impose burdens on property without having
to answer for its actions, the flip side of the argument stresses the
importance of the Corps of Engineers and other entities to
respond to flooding and other environmental difficulties. In its
brief to the Supreme Court, the Government stressed the
importance of the Corps of Engineers, emphasizing the historical
role that the government actor has played. Indeed, the Corps of
84 Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Supreme Court weighs federally created floods,
REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2012, 11:55 PM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/usa-court-flooding-
idINL1E8L35 1U20121003.
85 Brian T. Hodges, Important property rights victory in Arkansas Game &
Fish Commission v. United States, LIBERTY BLOG (Dec. 4, 2012),
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2012/agfc_property rights victory/.
86 Hodges, supra note 72.
87 id.
88 Brief for Respondent at 2, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (No. 11-597) 2012 WL 3680423, at *2 ("For
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Engineers has taken on the responsibility of managing and
improving navigable waters, and today it is responsible for
thousands of miles of commercial navigation channels and
hundreds of locks and dams. 89 In the context of water-resource
management, the Corps of Engineers' responsibilities include
flood control. 90
"Federal involvement in flood control dates to at least
1849," the Government's brief informs the Court, "but it was
after a series of deadly and devastating floods in the early 20th
century that Congress enacted legislation 'directly and openly
aimed at flood control."' 91 Reacting to the catastrophic lower
Mississippi River flooding of 1927, Congress passed the Flood
Control Act of 192892, authorizing the "largest public works
project undertaken up to that time in the United States. 93 Not
long after this legislation was enacted, Congress established the
first nationwide flood-control program.
94
Looking at the work that the Corps of Engineers has done
up to the present-day, it is clear that the Corps of Engineers
suffers from no lack of responsibilities to attend to. The Corps
currently has built or controls 11,750 miles of levees, and it
maintains and operates more than 690 dams that store more than
100 trillion gallons of water.95 These water control assets control
nearly two centuries, the United States Army Corps of Engineers has played
an essential role in developing, managing, and protecting the Nation's water
resources.").
89 See The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History, US ARMY CoRps
OF ENGINEERS,
http://www.usace.army.mil/About/Histora/Brie fHistoryoftheCors.aspx.
90 Brief for Respondent at 2, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States,




93 Id., citing United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606-07 (1986).
94 Brief for Respondent at 2, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (No. 11-597) 2012 WL 3680423, at *2.
95 Id.
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everything from flooding (with benefits to life, property, and the
environment) to navigation, water supply, hydropower, and
recreation. 96 Even examining solely the monetary benefits of the
Corps' flood-control projects, the impact is staggering, from 2000
to 2009 those projects are estimated to have saved an average of
$22.3 billion in damages per year.97  Beyond the monetary
impact, the actions of the Corps of Engineers affect the day to
day lives of approximately 4.5 million people who live or work
behind the Mississippi River and Tributaries project.98  This
project alone protects 22.4 million acres, has provided a 34:1
return on investment, and just in 2011 prevented flooding of
more than 10 million acres and damages of more than $110
billion.9
9
In oral arguments, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin
Kneedler argued that the Army Corps of Engineers "requires a
broad ambit of discretion" when making flood management
decisions, including leeway to release destructive floodwaters
downstream without incurring liability.' 00 Arguing for the United
States, Kneedler called the case "a classic example" of the
government's struggle to balance the "benefits and burdens" of
water control-in essence, that there was usually a winner and
96 1d. at 3 (Further, the "Corps facilities store 3 trillion gallons of municipal
and industrial water supplies, provide 24% of the Nation's hydropower
capacity, and receive 370 million visitors per year." 1d).97 Id. ("On average since 1928, the Corps' projects have cost only $1 for every
$7.17 in damage they have prevented. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES FACING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS 32-33 (2011).").
98 Brief for Respondent at 3, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United
States, No. 11-597 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2012).
99 Id.
100 Damon Root, Supreme Court Questions Federal Government's Narrow
Reading of Takings Clause, REASON.COM (Oct. 4, 2012, 11:55 AM),
http://reason.com/blog/2012/10/04/supreme-court-questions-federal-
governme.
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loser in the context of water release cases.' 0 1 He also said the
releases had only "incidental consequences.'' 1 2 It is true that if
the Corps of Engineers is so encumbered with liability concerns,
it could find its functions more difficult to perform effectively,
but this does not and should not exempt such entities from
compensating those individuals who bear the burden of
accomplishing the important societal functions of government
actors.
Looking at this dilemma practically, the myriad of
procedural and environmental requirements already in place tend
to cause the Corps of Engineers, and other governmental actors,
to make long-term decisions about how water will be managed.
Particularly in view of this Court's decision, any ensuing
flooding that could be interpreted as "permanent" could warrant
compensation, paid for out of the Corps' pocket. 1°3 The NEPA,
for example, requires the Corps of Engineers to prepare an
environmental impact statement for every major action that will
significantly affect the quality of the environment.10 4 Likewise,
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") 10 5 may require a
biological assessment by the Corps of Engineers and a secondary
opinion by the Fish and Wildlife Service.' 0 6 With these protocols
in place, the Corps of Engineers is required to articulate with
some particularity how it proposes to operate a project so that the
Corps of Engineers and other agencies can evaluate the effects of
101 Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Supreme Court weighs federally created floods,
CNBC.coM (Oct. 3,2012,2:25 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100131806.
102 Damon Root, supra note 102.
103 See generally Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
511 (2012).
'04 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
'0' 16 U.S.C. § 1531 etseq.
106 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)-(d). See generally In re Operation of the Mo.
River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing ESA and NEPA
requirements related to Corps operation of flood-control and irrigation project
on the Missouri River), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006).
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a proposed course of action. 10 7  This process of seemingly
endless checks and regulations in turn lends a relative
permanence to most significant decisions affecting the Corps'
responsibilities. 1
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With the Court's decision in the instant case, the Corps'
job is bound to be plagued with even more uncertainty in
weighing their future decisions. Though the Court deemed this
practical policy difficulty as less important than the Takings
Clause's role in protecting property rights from government
interference, going forward there will inevitably be more
litigation questioning the how and when of flooding liability.
C. Championing Property Rights - the Fifth
Amendment at Work.
The plight of the Corps of Engineers aside, the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause was designed to protect against
such government actions that try to force "some people alone to
bear public burdens, which in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' 0 9 The government's concern,
then, may be more rooted not in a desire to dodge all liability for
temporary takings, but in a desire to have a more clear-cut idea of
when they will and will not have to foot the bill for any and all
foreseeable consequences of their actions. Their slippery slope
argument plays to the fear that if the Court will not draw a bright
line in this case, it will lead to even more claims against its
crucial actors, and the expenses and difficulties will entrench the
Corps of Engineers and other entities from being able to function
correctly. ] 0  If the Court recognizes a temporary taking as
compensable in this case, will even the briefest of interruptions
107 Brief for Respondent at 22, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United
States, No. 11-597 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2012).
108 Id.
109 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
11o Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct at 521.
110
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 20, No. 2
from government action eventually be cause for expensive
litigation? It is for this reason that the court says "[w]hile we
recognize the importance of the public interests the Government
advances in this case, we do not see them as categorically
different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings
Clause cases. The sky did not fall after Causby, and today's
modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability.""'
It is the nature of the beast for government actors such as
the Corps of Engineers that when trying to control flooding, some
land and benefits may have to be sacrificed in order to get the job
done. With the facts in Arkansas Game & Fish, the Corps
flooded the state's duck hunting and lumber lands in favor of the
upstream farmers, who were able as a result of the Corps' actions
to increase their productivity. 112  Naturally, concerns of the
environmental impact of decisions to flood valuable wildlife
lands are dramatic here, due to the damage done by the habitual
flooding that change the fundamental uses of the wildlife area.
What if the farmlands had been downstream? The action taken
by the government may well have been different. The crux of the
issue is that of making difficult decisions. Flooding will happen
- the Corps and other entities exist to try and adapt to the
changing landscape in a way that will lead to the greatest public
benefit. Justice Sotomayor explained:
The problem with this case is that flooding is going to
occur naturally anyway. The government generally builds dams
to control that flooding to the benefit of all of the interests along
its affected route. And at some point, either the government is
going to make a decision that's going to help someone and
potentially hurt someone. And the question is, are all of those
situations going to be subject to litigation?'.'
11 Id
112Id. at 513.
113 Brian T. Hodges, More Thoughts on the Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission argument, LIBERTY BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012),
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Though none of the briefs addressed this important issue,
it shows the difficulty that a logically-based and seemingly fair
balancing test like the one implemented by the Court in Arkansas
Game & Fish does not solve most of the problems surrounding
such situations. The facts at hand reflect the difficulties specific
to this case, but the Commission is surely just one of many land
holders that, should one view this decision through a pessimistic
lens, merely want a piece of the proverbial pie. Undoubtedly, the
Court's rejection of a blanket exception to the Takings Clause in
Arkansas Game & Fish represents a step forward in protecting
property rights. 114 The decision eliminated a categorical defense
to takings claims, and established principles that should fend of
future categorical rules limiting government liability under the
Takings Clause. 1 5 The concern going forward, then, is that the
Court here has provided only a temporary fix for the temporary
takings issue, leaving the question of how a court should review
such a claim unanswered."
16
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Arkansas Game & Fish was one
that rejected a bright-line rule in favor of a more balanced
approach, reflecting the Court's understanding that not all cases
of temporary flooding are created equal. The logical conclusion
of the Court, however, is bound to have ramifications that seep
into other areas of Takings Clause liability. Whether one is of
the opinion that has the court has "whittle[d] away" the
protections against government overreach provided for by the
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2012/more-thoughts-on-the-arkansas-game-fish-
commission-argument/.
114 See generally Brian T. Hodges, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
United States: U.S.* Supreme Court Disapproves of Per Se Defenses in Takings
Cases, 65 PLANNING & ENVTL. No. 3 (2013).
115Id.116 id.
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Fifth Amendment," l7 or that the Court is a great champion of the
Takings Clause, to dismiss the implications of the Court's
decision in Arkansas Game & Fish as simple would be in error.
By looking at the intent, foreseeability, and character of
the intrusion, the Court clearly desires lower courts to be more
able to evaluate the outcome of each case that comes before them
on a fact-by-fact basis. Will this ill-defined standard for
determining if a taking has occurred prove sufficient in the face
of endless variations on the facts of Arkansas Game & Fish?
With the government interests and property interests in tension,
and uncertainty surrounding the standard that should be utilized
going forward, the Court has run quite a risk that this simple and
straightforward opinion will create a litigious swampland all its
own.
ELIZABETH JUDY
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